not only that, he began to purge some of them and actually attacked and killed some of them. > he began to take exception to the sons of iraq, which all came from the sunni tribes. Heartland, petraeus' "sons of iraq" were quickly becoming enemies of the state. > narrator: petraeus ordered tens of thousands of troops off the large bases and out among the iraqis. > the white house is calling its iraq plan the "new way forward". > narrator: that spring, general petraeus and almost 30,000 new troops initiated the surge. > the surge begins, but the president stands increasingly alone. > thousands of extra troops, both iraqi and american, will try to slow down the killing amongst sunni arabs. and it's not going to be good for america. if this goes bad, that's the end of the war. this is all in." he recognizes, this is it. you know, we're doubling down here." and petraeus corrects him and says, "we're not doubling down. > and the president says, "you know, this is really important. we are going to fight them." > narrator: and petraeus was blunt with the president. we are going to take away from al qaeda, sunni insurgents on one hand and then shia militia extremists on the others, the areas in which they operate. > i said, "get ready, because it is going to get harder before it gets easier. his father was a general who died in vietnam. rumsfeld reached into the pentagon bureaucracy for a four-star general and found george casey. > narrator: it was time to try a new general. > top military officer in iraq is being replaced. the last thing the white house wanted was any more bad news from iraq. the president was running for reelection. > narrator: the summer of 2004 was the height of the political season. > innocent victims of car bombings, and insurgents and terrorists. > the insurgents have stepped up their attacks since an interim iraqi government was installed late last month. > it is possible that iraq could move toward civil war. > there's been yet another spasm of violence in iraq. The new governing council, 140,000 american troops, and a war that really had just begun. i knew the agency made the assessment that there were about there were a lot of big things the first 48 hours. > but this is a big one, right? > there were a lot of big things that first five days. this wasn't the only thing on my list of things to do the first five days i was there. you know, i was working 20 hours a day in that period, as well. > you don't remember these guys coming in and saying, "this is 30,000 to 50,000 people, and my god, what are you doing?" > i just. i just don't remember it, honestly don't remember it. > he may have come in and spoken to me at great length about it. and the number's closer to 50 than it is 30." > narrator: ambassador bremer says he does not recall the conversation with general garner and the cia officer. this is what i'm doing." > and so i said, "well, charlie, what do you think?" and to the best of my memory, charlie said, "well, if you do this, you're going to drive 30,000 to 50,000 ba'athists underground by nightfall. and finally, bremer says, "look, i have my orders. i'm not asking for your advice."Īnd they argue a bit more. let us digest this thing, and then let us recommend some changes to you and come back here, and we'll get on the phone with rumsfeld to see if we can't soften this a bit." > and bremer kind of says, "look, you don't understand. and i said, "you know, this is too deep." i said, "give charlie and i about 45 minutes to an hour. > so we went in and we talked to ambassador bremer for a few minutes. > i walked down, and the cia guy, a great guy, was coming across the hall, and i said, "hey, charlie, have you read the de-ba'athification?" and he said, "yeah, that's why i'm here." i said, "well, let's go in and talk to the ambassador." > narrator: garner was worried that bremer seemed not to understand how things worked in iraq. > and i think one thing bremer found out that day was that he had no command over the military.Īround iraq. > narrator: and so ended paul bremer's first day in iraq. there just is not sufficient justification to shoot somebody because they're carrying a computer out of the old ministry of education building. > well, of course, it's against our code of honor. > narrator: military commanders refused to go along with bremer's idea. > it wasn't very smart to do because somebody on the staff immediately told the press that i had suggested shooting the looters, and we had a problem. > his point was you only needed to shoot a few of them to make that point and the looting would stop. > i did one thing that wasn't very smart, which was suggest to the staff meeting that i thought we should shoot the looters, that our military should have authority to shoot the looters, which they did not have at that time. narrator: as they drove into the city, bremer made a decision and promptly announced it to his new staff.
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